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THE SOCRATIC BERGSON
Perhaps the greatness of a great character is best to be seenin
the multitude of analogies which it evokes; at any rate, the
quality of suggestiveness makes secure draft upon our garrulous
human interest and certifies for its possessor some substantial
d l . More than any other man Bergson is the butt of our
contemporary curiosity; and since Bergson is by profession a
thinker, and since a thinker, unlike your h?an of deeds, is b y ,
profession never obvious, i t becomes a matter of moment to
discover just why he so touches us to the quick. The answer is
indicated, I think, by a countryman of Bergson's, ~douardLe
Roy,who has put the names of Bergson and Socrates in suggestive
collocation. Immediately we grasp the analogy and guess the
source of Bergson's suggestive power; for we remember Socrates'
own image of himself as a gadfly rousing the noble but somnolent
steed to action. We have been long lost in admiration of the
mighty thews, the glossy flanks, the high carriage of our intellectual Pegasus; i t has remained for Bergson to show him lumbering
and scant of breath.

" 'Know thyself' : the ancient maxim has remained the device
of philosophy since Socrates, the device which marks at least that
initial moment where, bending toward the depths of the subject,
it undertakes its proper work of penetration, whereas science
continues a surface expansion. To this venerable motto each
philosophy, turn by turn, has given a commentary and an application.
But M. Bergson, more than any other, has profoundly renewed the sense of this, as of all that he touches."
These are words with which M. Le Roy introduces his analogy,
and assuredly they are words that merit some pondering by those
who are in quest of the well-spring of that humanism which we
carry back to the Greeks-too often, I suspect, with the lugubrious conviction that it; was dried at the source.
Socrates, Augustine, Descartes, Kant,-yes, and Bagson:
each of these men is great because he has sought to know k t
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of all his own soul. And all, save as yet the last, have inspired
great edifices of philosophy, which we count as the treasurehouses of human thinking. They are men of a type: pertinacious
questors in their central realm, indifferent to the learning which
makes our average pride, eager for some internal truth where
others rest content with outward show, The knowledge which
they seek bears the better name of wisdom; for it is never that
illusion of intellect which dissipates itself in chimerical consumption of second intentions, but always an intimate intuition so
bound to conduct that it can point t h e effective way to men's
salvation. I t is knowledge that joins to action; it is humanistic
knowledge in the only true sense of humanism.
Socrates, Xenophon says, would not dispute of that which the
Sophists call " the world" nor yet of the laws which govern the
movements of the stars; his interest was in human &airs, above
all in justice and courage and temperance and wisdom. He
"brought philosophy down from heaven," diverting men's
attention from ~b ijv to zb iyaOdv, from ontology to morality.
The world "below the Moon" was the world of his concern; and
we must remember the sharp division which the ancients made of
this sublunary realm; above the Moon is the region of motions
eternal and incorruptible, below it is the domain not only of
spatial change, of physical motion, but also of that change in
time, generation and decay, of'which the Moon's own crescence
and senescence is, so to speak, an image. @va.rdr 8va.coTat rpixer:
surely mortal things befit mortality! and what is more truly ours
than this precious transiency of love and birth and death? and
what more alien to us than a Being transcendently aloof, whether
inspace or in thought, from alI the change and season of our days?
All the ontological scheming and proclaiming of the pre-Socratics
-what trivial matter it seems when the "midwife of souls"
begins asking after the Good!
In a recent number of the Revue Nh-Scolastique, an estirely
devout Thomist asails the Bergsonian notion of time. "In
reading the long and subtle developments given bythe author to
this thesis" (the intuition of time), says M. Farges, "it is impossible for a philosopher even a little familiar with the conceptions of general metaphysics and of ontology not to be struck by
the number and gravity of the confus'ons of ideas there encountered. The most fundamental of our classic conceptions
have been more or less emptied of their natural meaning, muti-

'
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lated, topsy-turvied at pleasure, to such point of distraction as to
seize with vertigo an inexperienced reader, If we may be permitted the expression, we would say-without wishing to impugn
in the least the intentions of the author-that it is a veritable
'sabotage' of ontology." Un vrai "sabotage" d'Ontologie! And
our Thomist goes on to show-with what pious horror best leave
to surmisethat Bergson has violated all the categorical conventions which make the philosophy of Aquinas the most categorical
and conventional of all philosophies. Bergson will not play the
dialectic g a r n e t h e essence of which is to concede the dialectic
ontology. Was i t not just so that Socrates shocked the "physicians of ignorance''-Hippias answering questions of astronomy
ex cathedra and Protagoras sulking because Socrates would not
"sail on his sea of words, beyond sight of land?"
Astronomy and dialectic are no doubt noble exercises, befitting the high court of philosophy; but it is God alone who can
always geometrise. For mere mortals the urgency of conduct is
fundamental in life; leisure for thought follows after; ethics is the
essential science; ontology and logic are luxuries of the fortunate.
And if at times we lose ourselves in the fatuous game of abstraction, forgetting the human scale of values and sacrificing our
energies in hybristic attempts upon the empyrean, then surely
the best gift of philosophy is a recall to the senses. "Socrates
autem primus "-these are the famous words of Cicero-" philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus
etiarn introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et
rnalis quaerere. "

The mind in search of analogies must surely be struck by the
many analogies between pre-Socratic Greek philosophy and the
philosophy called modem. Not a school of the one but finds its
analogue in the other. The Milesian evolutionists could not
have missed their kinship with Herbert Spencer, and ~b 9u~tp0\
is clearly cousin gerrnan to the " Unknowable. " Heraclitean
flux and Sophistic scepticism find their parallels in modem sen.
sationalism and the scepticism of Hume. The relationship of thc
Pythagoreans to our mathematical physicists is as obvious a
that of the Democritean atomism to our own prevailing materidism. The Eleatics are the veritable archetype of Germau
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Absolute Idealism; and if Hegel is the modern Parmenides, we
no less securely identify a modern Zeno in Mr. Bradley, who with
triumphant dialectic reduces his master's teachings to absurdity.
I need not~speakof the new school of Protagoras; they are everywhere self-proclaiming.
Plainly, the stage is superbly cleared for a modern Socratesprovided, of course, that we still have something to hope from
philosophy; for to a certain type of mind the Greeks have long
since pronounced the final philosophic dicta; henceforth human
experience can but exemplify what they, in their primal wisdom,
once for all enunciated. As Santayana expresses it-with an
apodictic austerity which brooks no question-" the age of controversy is past ; that of interpretation has succeeded. " It
seems to me that this is a familiar note; the gaunt and corded
physiogrriomy of Medizval thinking rises before me, ascetically
humble before the oracular Authority of the Past, but savagely
intolerant of the plastic and vital flesh which alone can give the
impress of character to what else must be but caricature of our
essential humanity. The main difference is that where your
Medizevalist lays his stress upon the omniscience of Providence,
our classicists extol the omniscience of the G r e e k s a n d as the
Greeks were undeniably human, $so fact0 their disciples are
humanists (indeed, I should add the humanists).
And human it is-to sigh for Saturn's golden reign, to remember Paradise with tears,-for dreams such as these mark the
unconquerable idealism of a race which, mired in the black and
stinking present, must yet project its vision of perfection into
some roseate dawn of life. But is it less human to look forward?
Canaan, Utopia, the Celestial City, which we can strive for as
well as innerly see,-are not these, too, humane? and because
they are inspirations to effort as well as patterns of delight,
should we therefore cast them forth? If contemplation is the
only virtue, if action is necessarily base, I am one who is not
ashamed to be reckoned in with the anthropologists-horrific
folk who, remembering that the Greeks anointed their bodies
with ointment from flasks of gracious form and delicate design,
with the same thought recall the strong butter which enriches the
shining beauty of the black African, and thank their benignant
stars that creams and pomades are more reticent than of yore.
Unquestionably Socrates would have enjoyed a voyage t o
Laputa. What a fine ironic speech he would have made about
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it! But would he have discovered wisdom amid the stargazers? "One man makes a vortex a11 round, and steadies the
earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the
earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in
arranging them as they are arranges them for the best never
enters into their minds; and instead of finding any superior
strength in it, they rather expect to discover another Atlas of the
world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing
than the good;--of the obligatory and containing power of the
good they think nothing and yet this is the principle which I
would f a i n learn if any one would teach me. "
I am not affirming that Bergson ishevery respect the Socrates
of to-day. In many respects William James seems more nearly
to hold the character--with his eager and many-sided inquisitiveness, his wilful insistence upon the concrete, his inability to
see ideas other than as principles of action, his power to seize
and inspire his fellow men. James is like Socrates in all this;
but the Socrates of to-day is a temper rather than an individual;
it is actuating the thought of many men, demanding of them that
their philosophic search be a search after the good, and a good
that shall be not an object of contemplation but a pattern of
conduct. In F r a n c e a nation whose social genius makes it a
natural field for the Socratic spirit-this temper is most marked;
and it is in France that Bergson has performed the needful and
characteristically Socratic office of confuting the Laputians,
The modern mind has been afflicted with a kind of spiritual
astigmatism, impelling it to bifocalise the world from every angle
of observation-"physical
and psychical," "mechanical and
teIeologicaI," " appearance and reality," all the nonsensical compartmentalising which we have been accustomed to call philosophy,-and invariably, as it would seem, to make the worse
choice of some cosmic Ansichf the measure of our wisdom.
Bergson protests against this. He reminds us that discursive
reason is a t best but a preparation for more thorough understanding, for completer sense, and that man's part is to know first
of all his proper self. His "anti-intellectualism" gives much
pious offense, but he seems to me only to be saying that genuine
knowledge is humanly assimilable knowledge, vdr]at< rather than
Brdrvota. "By intuition," he says, "is meant the kind of infeUectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an obje&
in order to coincide with what- is unique in it and consequently
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inexpressible. Analysis on the contrary, is the operation which
reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to objects
common both to it and other objects. To analyse, therefore, is to
express a thing as a function of something other than itself-"
Is not this plain statement of plain fact? If it be not so, the
fault Iies not in the fact stated, but in our own grotesque prepossession with that celldarisation of the mind which we call
psychology, wherein we seek to reduplicate by art the artificial
cellulz into which we would compress the world. Plato1swas a
better inspiration; from the world of Ideas we can come with
ilIuminated eyes to the spectacle of materiality, but never from
the material world can we surmise the nature of that being whose
definition is power. As Bergson puts it, from intuition to
analysis we readiIy pass, but from analysis to intuition never.

From a different approach to the problem of knowledge Henri
Poincar6 made quite as sharp a distinction of intuition from
analysis as does Bergson; and for the same fundamental reason.
"In mathematics," he says, "logic is called Analysis and to say
analysis is to say division, dissection. It can have no other
instrument save the scalpel or the microscope. Logic and intuition have each its necessary rble. Both are indispensable.
Logic, which alone can give certitude, is the instrument of demonstration ; intuition isthe instrument of invention. " This is
' the distinction.
The reason why it is radical Poincar6 states
clearly in another connection, where he is contrasting the analytic with the intuitive elements in our conceptions of spatial
continua. After resuming the analytical definition of a continuum of n dimensions (viz., " an ensemble of YZ co-ordinates"),
he proceeds:
" This definition makes a ready disposal of the intuitive origin
of the notion of continuity, and of all the riches which this notion
conceals. It returns to the type of those definitions which have
become so frequent in mathematics since the tendency to 'arithmetise,' this science-definitions mathematically irreproachable
but philosophically unsatisfying. They replace the object to be
defined and the intuitive notion of this object by a construction
made of simpler materials; one sees indeed that one can effectively make this construction with these materials, b u t one sees
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also that one can make many others. What i s not to be seen is the
deeper reason why one assembles these materials in just this, and not
in another fashion. The ' arithmetisation' of mathematics is not
a bad thing, but it is not all. l'
Poincare diagnoses precisely the weakness that besets all
abstractive thinking. In mathematics it is " arithmetisation " ;
in philosophy-and, I suspect, a t times in criticism-it is the
scholastic passion for dichotomising. Over-conceptualisation,
the word for the reality, the letter for the spirit-fascinated by
the ease with which we can palm and shuffle the airy mintages of
our intellect, we yieId to the gaming instinct and stake our all
. . only to lose, say PoincarC and Bergson, for truth is cast in
the firmer mould of active experience. If philosophy stood for
no more than mental dexterity, it would have been long perished.
But a living philosophy means life, as Plato knew,-and in the
Parmenides what lordly sport he made of your unredeemed
dialectic !
The " arithmetisation " of mathematics, which Poincard contrasts with " intuition," represents, I believe, the last stand in a
process of regressive abstraction which has been going on since
the Hellenes first formulated the idea of physical science. It
is a process so apt of application that I would briefly resume it.
The starting-point is figured by Archimedes' demand for a
r a 6 o.cO from which to move the world. Such a ?FOG mir, such an
immovable core of physical reality, seemed to the Greek physicists
an essential of science. I t is axiomatic, says Dercyllides, a
truth "accordant with reason, " that in the Universe some bodies
are mobile and some immobile; that all are either mobile or
immobile is beyond reason. Greek physics was reared upon this
assumption. The unmoving Earth was placed a t the centre and
about i t the revolving panorama of the Heavens. The Pythagorean suggestion of an Earth and a Counter-Earth revolving in
unison about a central fire is only a variation of this, for Hestia,
the Hearth of the Cosmos, but takes the place of the unmoving
Earth. Even the atomism of Democritus and Lucretius accepts
the same principle; for while the Cosmos takes its form from the
swirl of sweeping atoms, this is entirely because their motion is a
gravitational, a d o m w a r d flow: the universe possesses an "up "
and a "down," a fixed spatial frame within which all motions
can be measured and computed.
The Greeks never passed beyond this conception; and indeed,
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it is only to-day that we moderns-mainly under the guidance of
PoincarGhave come to redise the fictive and conventional
character of our formulation of the Cosmos as a function of
absolute time and space. We have long been taught that
Copernicus accomplished the great translation from the Old to
the New; and in the field of morals (little as that was in his
intention) this is near the truth, but I greatly doubt if the real
life of his influence is not to be found in the stimulated interest
in mechanical motions, which resqlted in Newtonian physics.
Newton made definite once for aLl the conception of a frame of
absolute time and absolute space within which all change could
be reckoned. He carried to its consequence Greek astronomy.
The material 7co6 m6, in its gross planetary form, disappears, but
its place is taken by the hardy less material shape, spatial and
temporal, by which all possible events are measured and circumscribed. The cosmic stage is cIeared for the action, and it
remains only for Laplace, with his nebular gyres, to complete the
mise en s c h e .
More effectually than any other, Poincard has pricked this
bubble. The axiom of Dercyllides, which in Newton's thought
is denied for everything excepting the empty frame of Creation,
he has negated in toto. Time and space, he has shown, are as
relative and fluxional as atoms and ions; they expand with our
grandeurs and contract with our modestiesor at least, we cannot
know S they do not. To put it in other terms, there is a limit
to our outer and physical knowledge, and that limit is set, not
by the stations of the stars, b e by our frail and changing human
needs.
And the "arithmeticians? " Blind to the fact that the central
meaning of life must be the concrete experience of living, and step
by step driven from the vivid cplots of the Greek naturalists, on
through the welter of atomism, and thence out into the chill
vacancy of absolute time and space-from this last resort banished, they still pursue their restless process of standardisation in
a chaos of abstraction so transcendental that there is nothing left
to standardise. They seek a Station and a Frame, altogether
oblivious of the fact that their sole content is a chimzera in vacuo
bonabdnans.
In a characteristic and eloquent passage Poincarb says : "Le
continu physique est pour ainsi dire une ndbdeuse non rdsolue,
les instruments les plus perfection116 ne pourraient parvenir A la
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r&oudre; . . c'est l'esprit seule qui peut la ~Lsoudreet c'est le
continu mathhatique qui est la n4buleuse rkolue en Ctoiles. "
The stars themselves are apparitions, singled by our limitations
out of a Nature whose essence is fathomless to our gaze.

From the ancient axiom of the mobile and the immobile,
Aristotle derives a corollary of the utmost moment. "Evidently,"
he says, "those who say all things are a t rest are not right, nor
are those who say that all things are in movement. For if all
things are at rest, the same statements will always be true and
the same always false. . . . And if all are in motion, nothing
will be true, nothing false." In other words, the frame of the
physical world is also the frame of the logical; truth and error
lock step with time and space.
The Greeks invented and Aristotle formulated logic. Like
their mathematics it has proved a potent sharpener of the world's
thought-but, as in the case of mathematical thinking, the blade
is in some danger of being whetted to a nub. The "arithmetising " of mathematics finds its parallel in the scholasticising of the
intellect. In each case the error is that of identifying reason
with the form rather than with the matter of intelligence, forgetting that what makes our thought living thought is not its
power of abstract construction, but its intuitive ability to perceive why experience assembles its materials "in just this, and
not in another fashion. "
The Greeks were many things, but no one will deny that they
were not philologists. For them speech was barbarous or
Hellenic; and as speech, so experience. This has been the misfortune of logic, which in a large sense has been merely a refinement from Hellenic discourse. That it has adapted itself to the
like-tempered tongues of western Europe is perhaps as much due
to the autocracy of Hellenic thought as to their own native genius.
In any case, the analytic tendency, fostered in Low Latin, and
carried to its extreme in tongues developed under Latin patronage is little more than the bitter exemplification of category and
syllogism in their unredeemed application to human discourse.
A highly inflected language like the Greek could sustain the
syllogistic analysis without utter loss of life; but the lapidary
zeal of the Scholastics, cutting, sawing, polishing their concepts

THE SUCRATIC BERGSON
to nicest exclusion and closest interlocking, has tended to convert
our instrument of speech into a cunning mosaic rather than the
fluid reflection of thought; it is, as Plato might say, "thrice
removed from the king and from the truth."x
The consequence to modern speech has been to make it hard
and mechanical; language has become an index rerum, a kind of
notation of experience, whose curious affinity to mathematical
notations is hourly bringing mathematics and logic into more
indiscriminate communion. Undoubtedly for practical affairs,
for business, analytic speech is the most efficient human instrument ever created,-but the walls of the counting-house are not
yet the pillars of the firmament; to the business of living there
is to be added the art of living well. Our danger is a mere
external fascination in the click and glitter of our highly polished
verbal machine; so that our thinking resolves into a drone of
Aves and Paters, each told by an undeniably solid bead and
each devoid of all spiritual sign5cance. The most horrible
monument I have ever beheld is the Mormon temple in Salt
Lake City; it is built with deadly symmetry of line and angle,
every joint conspicuous and every unit in relief,--exactly as a
child might build with blocks; and what makes it so horrible is
just that it is infantile in conception and monstrous in size, the
work of beings in stature men, who had yet never been able to
put away childish things; we get from it the veryshiver which the
deeds of the Cyclopes gave the Greeks. Under the stringency of
a logic which was no doubt a valuable criticism of a more plastic
speech, our modern discourse, and the thought of which it is the
image, tends constantly to sink into a like monstrous infantilism.
Aristotelian logic in its iron demand that words shaU have that
constancy of meaning-conceived by Aristotle as a sort of conceptual essencewhich they never have in living speech, has
constructed for the intellectual world a kind of frame, analogous
to that established by Greek mathematics in the physical realm,
with the principle of identity for its xoir mQ. It has enabled
rigid thinking, but in substituting concepts for intuitions i t has
too often purchased elegance at a cost of sincerity and power.
There is another form of expression, belonging to barbarous
'A crisp presentation of the relation of thought to language is A. D. Sheffield's Grammur and Thinking, esp. the section on "Analytic and 1nflec.ted
Speech," while Aristotelian logic is exuberantly pilloried in F. C S. Schiller's
Formd Logic.
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tongues, disdained of the Greeks, which it is worth while to hold
in mind if only that we may gauge the distance we have travelled.
Polysynthesis or holophrasis, it is called, and a pertinent example,
which I borrow from Jane Harrison, is the Fuegian mamihlapinu.tu@zi"looking-at-each-other, -hoping-that-either-will-offer-todo-something-which-both- parties desire - but - are - unwilling - to
do." The vital situation is the thing designated (if " thing " it
may be called), the expression being moulded to suit just this,
and not any possible, mutuality. If speech can hit off intuitiont
we can hardly imagine an apter conformity.
The so-called "anti-intellectualism1' of Bergson is nd more
than a fundamental insistence that experience is primarily holophrastic. His criticism of the logomachies of the conceptmongers, his asseveration that the test of reason is intuition,
above all his contention that la d u d e rdelle, gathering in itself
before and after, is the focus of reality, all this is but his studied
protest against the artitice and inconsequence of our mental
legerdemain. He is telling us-what we have often suspectedthat the human spirit is never garrulous nor elegant in its tense
moments of growth, but is rather awkward and stammering,
frail of speech but gifted with a power more than of tongues to
stir in men's hearts a responsive understanding. What, I wonder,
would become of our tragedies, and the living strength of them,
save for that energy of situation and action which always a t the
last outpasses the eloquence of words? .
The lifelessness, the dramatic sterility, with which themathematical method has invested the physical universe is the butt
of Poincare's criticism. The similar lifelessness and dramatic
sterility with which our philosophy has been infected is the object
of Bergson's attack. In each case the disease--which might well
be called the fallacy of the "dividing intellect1'--is of Greek
origin, though arithmetisation and concept-polishing have
alike gone far beyond the surmise of any Greek;-and that the
disease is one and the same is well enough evidenced by our
contemporary blurring of the boundary between logic and mathematics,--an identical bent is leading to identical conclusions.'

-

-

"Mathematics as a science commenced when first some one, probably a
Greek, proved propositions about any things or about some things, without
specification of definite particular things." A. N. Whitehead, I?alroducfion
to Mathematics. Fons et origo of Iogic and mathematics are thus explicitly
identified.
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Bergson and Poinear6 have each ministered to our ailment,
starting respectively from its inner and its outer symptoms, but
finding an identical cure in their critiques of our apprehensions
of time and space, with the single implication of the primacy of
intuition. Thus at last the TOG orG-whether of Archimedes or
Aristotleis rightfully banished to the realm of illusion.
As for the reputed "mysticism " of Bergson's notion of time,
of kz durke rrblle, I may best reply by citing the naive antagonism
of my excellent Thomist. "At first glance," he says, "it would
seem subtle and indeed paradoltical to wish to found a whole
. philosophy upon the notion of Time. But upon reflection, and
especially remembering the marvellous Peripatetic synthesis
entirely erected upon the notion of Movement-a concept so
heighboring that of Time, one is tempted rather to give credit
to the author,-not to be sure, without some misgiving, for if
Movement is a phenomenon patent to the senses, this is not true
of Time,the most obsmre and mysterious perhaps of all natural
phenomena. This contrast was indeed already remarked by the
ancients when they said, 'Motus sensibus ipsis patet, non autem
tempus.' Hence we may very reasonably fear that sophism
could find naught more easy than to conceal itself amid these
profound shades, and that in place of building upon a rock, as
Aristotle, M. Bergson erects his house upon the shi£ting sands of
conjecture." Proceeding, he quotes Aristotle's dehition of time
as the number of motion in relation to before and after, Lpcflybs
xrvrjmos x a ~ &rb T Q ~ T E P O V xai iIor~pov,adding in comment: "This
definition has regard for the time whkh measures. As to
the time which is measwed, it is no other than movement, in
that it falls under the measure of the before and after. It is the
same distinction as that of the numbering number and the numbered number, r b +pr8p4pevov,r i trpr0yy~dv."
Truly, a completer justification of Bergson's intention could
not be required. Bergson had diverted attention from the
numbering to the numbered; he has recalled us from the formal
measure to the reality which is measured; and he has given us
to see that that reality is itself a movement which outruns all
our measures in its creative evolution of a world. Ontology
destroyed is cosmology redivivus.
HARTLEYBURRALEXANDER.
University of Nebmka.
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